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ABSTRACT 
With a point of departure in the concept "uncomfortable knowledge," this article presents a case 
study of how the American Planning Association (APA) deals with such knowledge. APA was 
found to actively suppress publicity of malpractice concerns and bad planning in order to sustain a 
boosterish image of planning. In the process, APA appeared to disregard and violate APA's own 
Code of Ethics. APA justified its actions with a need to protect APA members' interests, seen as 
preventing planning and planners from being presented in public in a bad light. The current article 
argues that it is in members' interest to have malpractice critiqued and reduced, and that this best 
happens by exposing malpractice, not by denying or diverting attention from it as APA did in this 
case. Professions, organizations, and societies that stifle critique tend to degenerate and become 
socially and politically irrelevant "zombie institutions." The article asks whether such degeneration 
has set in for APA and planning. Finally, it is concluded that more debate about APA's ethics and 
actions is needed for improving planning practice. Nine key questions are presented to 
constructively stimulate such debate.  
Highlights: >A study of moral hypocrisy with the American Planning Association (APA). >"APA 
seriously breached its own ethics", according to JAPA editor. >APA is found to deny and divert 
evidence of malpractice and bad planning. >APA's hypocrisy is shown to place transparency and 
billions of dollars of citizens' money at risk. >Nine points for debate aimed at reducing hypocrisy 
with APA and improving ethics in planning. 
 
Keywords: Planning, uncomfortable knowledge, moral hypocrisy, professional ethics, planning 
ethics, malpractice, the American Planning Association, Journal of the American Planning 
Association. 
 3 
 
UNCOMFORTABLE KNOWLEDGE 
 In organizational theory, uncomfortable knowledge is knowledge that is disagreeable or 
intolerable to an organization. Rayner (2011: 5-7) identifies four strategies in increasing order of 
sophistication for how organizations typically deal with uncomfortable knowledge: 
 
1.  Denial represents a refusal to acknowledge or engage with information.  
2.   Dismissal acknowledges that information exists, and may involve some minimal 
engagement up to the point of rejecting it as faulty or irrelevant.  
3.   Diversion involves the creation of an activity that distracts attention away from an 
uncomfortable issue.  
4.   Displacement occurs when an organization engages with an issue, but substitutes 
management of a representation of a problem for management of the problem itself.  
 
 What follows is a case study of how the American Planning Association manages 
uncomfortable knowledge about urban policy and planning. APA typically projects a "sunny, 
relentlessly positive" image of urban planning, in the words of an insider and informant for the 
present study. Thus APA presents itself as the promoter and guardian of the public interest, 
participation, transparency, openness, truth, social justice, and ethics in planning, as evidenced in 
APA’s own publications. By taking a look behind the sunny image – at how APA handled a study 
containing uncomfortable knowledge about malpractice in planning – this article uncovers another 
side to APA, what Flyvbjerg (1996) and Yiftachel (1998) calls the "dark side" of urban policy and 
planning.  
 We will see that in this case APA's immediate reaction to uncomfortable knowledge was simple 
denial, i.e., strategy 1 above, which Rayner (2011: 7, 12) defines as the refusal or inability of 
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organizations to acknowledge information, even when external bodies or individuals within the 
organization seek actively to bring it to collective attention. We will also see that, when pressed, 
APA escalated its strategy for dealing with uncomfortable knowledge from denial to diversion, 
diversion being defined as the organizational strategy of establishing a decoy activity that distracts 
attention from a subject or problem, thus trying to ensure that knowledge about it is not created or 
shared (Rayner 2011: 7, 12).  
 Finally, we will consider more productive strategies for dealing with uncomfortable knowledge 
than those employed by APA. In the case study, APA said it would not promote a study published 
by JAPA, which contained uncomfortable knowledge about malpractice and bad planning, to 
protect APA members' interests. Here it is argued that it is in members' interest to have malpractice 
critiqued and reduced, and that this can only happen by exposing malpractice, not by hiding it as 
APA does. Critique is historically a main driver of progress in human affairs. Professions, 
organizations, and societies that stifle critique tend to degenerate and become socially and 
politically irrelevant "zombie institutions" (Beck 1994: 40). This article raises the question of 
whether such degeneration and irrelevance applies to APA and urban planning and, if so, what can 
be done to counter it.1 
 
  
WHEN PLANNERS LIE WITH NUMBERS 
 The author first became aware of APA's approach to uncomfortable knowledge about urban 
policy and planning when he and his co-authors submitted an article to APA's flagship academic 
publication, the Journal of the American Planning Association (JAPA), called "Underestimating 
Costs in Public Works Projects: Error or Lie?" (Flyvbjerg, Holm, and Buhl 2002). The abstract of 
the article reads as follows: 
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"This article presents results from the first statistically significant study of cost 
escalation in transportation infrastructure projects. Based on a sample of 258 
transportation infrastructure projects worth US$90 billion and representing different 
project types, geographical regions, and historical periods, it is found with 
overwhelming statistical significance that the cost estimates used to decide whether 
such projects should be built are highly and systematically misleading. 
Underestimation cannot be explained by error and is best explained by strategic 
misrepresentation, that is, lying. The policy implications are clear: legislators, 
administrators, investors, media representatives, and members of the public who value 
honest numbers should not trust cost estimates and cost-benefit analyses produced by 
project promoters and their analysts." 
 
 The article shows that as a consequence of cost underestimation nine out of ten large public 
works projects have cost overruns. Cost overruns are large, even when measured in conservative 
terms, i.e., excluding inflation and using the final business case as base line. The study documents a 
cost overrun of 45 percent for rail projects, 34 percent for bridges and tunnels, and 20 percent for 
roads. Standard deviations are large, too, indicating risk to the second degree, i.e., risk of cost 
overrun and of the overrun being much larger than expected. Most interesting of all, overruns have 
been constant for the 70 years for which data are available, indicating that no improvements in 
estimating and managing costs have been made over time. Finally, the study raises serious concerns 
that cost underestimation appears to be deliberate in many cases.2 
 In sum, the study documents billions of dollars of cost overruns and waste that could, in large 
part, be eliminated by better policy and planning. It seemed obvious to the authors that the results 
must therefore be effectively communicated to policy makers and planners, which is why we 
submitted the paper to JAPA, following and expanding upon a tradition pioneered by Martin 
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Wachs's (1989) classic article, "When Planners Lie with Numbers," and by Kain (1990), Pickrell 
(1992), and Wachs (1990). We aimed to give this area of study more weight by contributing the 
largest and best dataset seen so far, making statistical analyses of cost underestimation and overrun 
possible for the first time and allowing firmer conclusions than previously about forecasting 
outcomes and forecasting behavior. 
 JAPA accepted the study for publication and agreed it documents a major issue in urban policy 
and planning that needs public attention. In the months leading up to publication, JAPA therefore 
contacted APA to enlist professional support for disseminating the study to media. Contacting APA 
was JAPA's idea, but we agreed that seeking professional support for media contacts made sense. 
As it turned out, the person we liaised with at APA initially found the study "very newsworthy" and 
developed a comprehensive media strategy, including a press conference about the study; 
exclusives with The New York Times, The Sunday Times of London, and a major US television 
network; coverage by The Associated Press and Reuters; and finally regional press releases for 
media in the 8-12 largest US metropolitan areas. We agreed that APA would manage the media 
strategy in the US and we, with our university's press office, would manage it in the rest of the 
world 
 However, after a few weeks – while we were busy collaborating with APA on the press releases 
– our APA liaison suddenly wrote to let us know he needed to discuss the media strategy internally 
at APA. The effort had evidently grown to a size where he clearly felt uncomfortable by continuing 
it without involving top management. Soon after, he returned with the following discouraging 
message: 
 
"After discussion and consideration, [APA] does not want me to do anything in terms 
of promoting, whether as an exclusive story or on a regional basis, the results of your 
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infrastructure cost underestimation study as appearing in the Summer issue of JAPA ... 
I'm sorry I can't be of further help." 
 
 This was a complete turnaround in both tone and content, compared with APA's previous 
enthusiasm for the project and our extensive correspondence and the comprehensive publicity 
strategy developed by APA. Our joint work, including on the press releases, was stopped 
unilaterally by APA. A colleague got in touch with a former top-level official with APA, who had 
good connections within the organization, to find out what was going on. This person said that he 
believed "it was the 'higher ups' [in APA] who put the 'kabosh' [sic] on the press release[s]," but 
also that "the APA staff was [still] anxious to promote and publicize your work." 
 
 
DENIAL 
 When asked what the reasons were for APA's sudden change of heart, our APA liaison 
explained it was, first, fear that "the media will cast this story negatively and planners will be 
among the guilty" and, second, that "some of the study's finding[s] ... could work against us [APA 
and its members]." Our APA liaison further explained that he felt responsible for what he called 
APA's "180 degree switch" and that he found the study both exciting and newsworthy, exactly what 
journalists and editors are looking for. With a background in journalism, he had reacted to the study 
with the gut instinct of a journalist, seeing the potential for maximum media coverage, only to learn 
that APA would prefer no coverage at all: 
 
"I readily admit that I became excited about your research findings and the fact that 
JAPA is publishing a very newsworthy story. My background is journalism, and as a 
former daily and weekly newspaper reporter and editor ... I started to think about a 
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publicity strategy for your article first and the possible negative implications for the 
planning profession second. In terms of my job at APA, I need to think about the 
latter." 
 
 Our contact at JAPA similarly explained: 
 
"[APA] is worried that the spin will be that planners are liars, even though this is not 
what you say in your article, and [APA] is trying to protect the profession from that 
bad press." 
 
 Our APA liaison further pointed out that, "Given APA's concerns, I would encourage taking a 
much more restrained approach in the press release" than we had done in the release we had been 
collaborating on so far. Finally, our APA liaison said he had been asked by APA to draft such a 
more subdued release covering the study. This was bad news for the authors, because it meant that a 
powerful organization like APA would now write its own press release about our study. We would 
have no control over the APA release, which we understood would not be designed to emphasize 
the newsworthiness of the study, but would instead gloss it over in order to protect APA member 
interests. I asked our APA liaison to kindly let me comment on APA's press release before it was 
finalized. He agreed to this and said he would send me a copy for comment, but he didn't do so. Our 
contact with APA quickly died out as we made the move from partners to opponents, from 
collaboration to conflict. Commenting on this paper, our APA liaison now explains APA’s 
approach by saying “It was clear to us the article had high news value and, after discussing this 
point internally and with you – and learning of your own extensive efforts to obtain publicity – we 
concluded that the article did not need the APA’s promotion and publicity to generate news 
coverage.” However, this is not consistent with what we were told at the time, nor with the fact that 
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our and our university’s efforts to obtain publicity for the article in the US did not begin until after 
APA dropped its media strategy for the article and only because they dropped it. 
 At first, JAPA was on our side. JAPA's management decided that JAPA would assert their 
independence of APA by single-handedly facilitating media coverage of the study in the US, no 
matter what APA said. Our contact at JAPA sent us the following message: 
 
"I was very disappointed to see [APA's representative, name deleted] latest note to you 
saying APA does not want him to work on PR for JAPA articles. I think our editors 
will be discussing this policy with the APA. Regarding your article, however, I'm 
prepared to do what I can to facilitate media coverage in the US." 
 
 But despite his good will, or perhaps because of it, within days our JAPA contact clearly came 
under pressure to retract his decision, now explaining: 
 
"I'm afraid I spoke out of turn in offering to pitch a story on your article to the US 
media ... APA has particular political reasons not to spotlight your findings. [We, at 
JAPA] discussed this ... [and]agreed that it would not be right for me to do this in light 
of APA's stance. I am therefore afraid I will have to retract my offer ... I apologize for 
this about face. I personally hope your findings get a great deal of media attention." 
 
 It was instructive to see how APA was able to produce one "180 degree switch" and "about 
face" after another. But power defines rationality, as argued in Flyvbjerg (1998: 227-34). This was 
power at work, making individuals do what they did not want to, against their basic beliefs. The 
personal greeting from our JAPA liaison that he hoped the study would get a "great deal of media 
attention," despite APA's determination not to promote the paper, testifies to this. In effect, APA's 
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"particular political reasons" seemed to be dictating the actions of a supposedly independent 
academic journal, the world-leader in its field, and thus violating rule number one in academic 
publishing: that such publishing must be thoroughly independent from outside interests.  
 Instead of APA openly acknowledging the implications of the JAPA study, that 
• planners are doing an exceptionally poor job at costing major public works projects, 
sometimes perhaps intentionally, 
• this results in large-scale waste of public money and violations of basic principles of 
democracy, and, 
• APA, as the main professional body for planners, has a responsibility to help rectify this 
situation,  
APA had decided to gloss this over and suppress publicity of the unpleasant facts. APA's idea of 
protecting member interests was apparently to deny and undermine malpractice concerns in 
planning, thus defending the status quo. Our idea was to improve planning by problematizing 
malpractice and demonstrating how it may be avoided. 
 To APA, the study on cost overrun was a clear instance of Rayner's (2011: 5-7) "uncomfortable 
knowledge," described above, i.e., knowledge that is disagreeable or intolerable to an organization. 
Of the four strategies for how organizations typically deal with uncomfortable knowledge – denial, 
dismissal, diversion, and displacement – here we see denial at work: APA refused to acknowledge 
the concerns about planners' apparent misrepresentation of costs in large public works projects, 
even when bodies like JAPA and individuals like the authors of the study were actively seeking to 
bring this knowledge to the collective attention of APA and its membership. When we pressed 
further to get the information heard, APA ramped up from denial to the more sophisticated strategy 
of diversion, which consists in establishing a decoy activity that attempts to distract attention from 
an issue, thus trying to ensure that knowledge about it is not created or shared (Rayner 2011: 7, 12). 
Let us see how APA did this. 
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DIVERSION 
Presumably in order to control information about the JAPA study, APA decided they would try to 
"track and monitor all reporter requests for copies [of the study]." To achieve this, APA now 
instructed JAPA to not get involved with media contact at all and instead "direct reporter inquiries 
to [APA] and we [APA] will follow-up [sic] ... We are doing this so that if we want to talk to a 
reporter about the study, we don't give him or her a copy of the study until we've had a chance to 
talk with them." According to APA's plan, neither JAPA nor the authors would have a say in what 
the media were told by APA about the study. 
 JAPA accepted APA's machinations, we did not. It was less than three weeks to publication 
when APA's attempt at controlling public exposure of the study hit us out of the blue, and we 
quickly decided to try and beat APA to the media. First, we personally pitched our story and offered 
exclusives to the editors of The New York Times and The Sunday Times of London, which they both 
accepted.3 We figured that if two prominent newspapers like these would cover the study, then the 
rest of the media would follow. This proved to be correct. We realized we did not need PR people 
to communicate with media. In fact, editors and journalists seemed to prefer to deal with us directly. 
Second, while The New York Times and The Sunday Times of London were printing their 
exclusives, we emailed copies of the study and a press release to every other main media in the 
English-speaking world, including the US. Many of these media covered the study. 
 It must have taken APA a few days to realize they had little sway over who received the study 
and how it was covered. APA then ramped up its strategy from denial to diversion, i.e., APA now 
actively tried to distract attention away from the study and the uncomfortable issues it raised. APA 
did this by posting a public comment about the study on its website, in effect a disclaimer that tried 
to paper-over and downplay the study's findings:4  
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"While we [APA] can appreciate the technical skill and data collection capability 
employed in the article, as well as the policy questions that are raised, readers of this 
technical article should bring their own context to the discussion ... Planners ought to 
be concerned not only with the costs of public works ... There is a danger in being 
overly analytical about the details of processes that are ultimately not empirical so 
much as they are democratic and political – a behavior that Alfred North Whitehead 
called, aptly, 'misplaced concreteness.' " (American Planning Association 2002). 
 
 APA's public comment was written by our APA liaison. It is interesting to note that in the APA 
comment he now tried to frame the study as "technical," by twice labeling it as such, and as being 
"overly analytical," thus undoubtedly encouraging a certain reserve with readers against the study. 
This was at complete odds with his own views about the study expressed to us previously, when he 
had described it as "very newsworthy" and himself as "excited about your research findings." 
 It is also interesting to note APA's artificial juxtaposition in the comment of "empirical" on one 
side and "democratic and political" on the other, as if democratic and political issues cannot be 
studied empirically, which is plain wrong. Finally, things get even more obfuscated with the 
deployment of Whitehead, the heavyweight mathematician, logician, mentor and collaborator of 
Bertrand Russell, and someone who would recognize a technical argument if he saw one. But 
unfortunately APA gets Whitehead wrong. The fallacy of misplaced concreteness is about treating 
abstractions as realities. It is not about being overly analytical about details or being empirical at all, 
but quite the opposite. APA's use of Whitehead appears to be a botched attempt at oppressive 
deployment of symbolic capital rather than an actual rational argument. Fortunately, the media did 
not buy APA's interpretation of the study but covered it instead like APA had originally intended 
for them to do, i.e., as newsworthy and exciting. 
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 In its public comment on the JAPA study APA also boosted its own high ethics in the manner 
that has become a trademark of the organization, taking a normative stand for participation, 
transparency, the public interest, and good information: 
 
"This [the technical character of the study, etc.] doesn't mean planners shouldn't get 
involved. Of course planners have an ethical obligation to promote sound project 
planning and the greatest possible degree of public involvement, transparency, and the 
understanding of the options available ... [E]ven if [planners] are not necessarily able 
to effect as much control over the process as would be useful to the public's interest, 
[planning] still requires their strong and active presence and voice for good 
information and an open and ethical process" (American Planning Association 2002). 
 
 It is interesting to note that APA's comment, which stresses the virtues of transparency, ethics, 
etc., itself seems to be a deliberate and direct attempt by APA to block transparency, information, 
and openness for an important but uncomfortable planning issue, namely cost overruns of billions 
of dollars on major planning projects. APA's words and actions are diametrically opposed on this 
point, showing a double standard that is used by APA because it feared the JAPA study might 
present planners in a bad light. APA's comment and its double standard can only be seen as an 
attempt at managing uncomfortable knowledge by the "diversion strategy" described above, where 
the comment and its obfuscating and misleading content functions as a decoy activity that aims at 
distracting attention from the issue at hand – here planners who appear to systematically 
misrepresent the costs of projects – thus hampering the spread of knowledge about this issue. 
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IS JAPA TRULY INDEPENDENT? 
 The perhaps most surprising thing about APA's attempts at diverting attention away from the 
uncomfortable issues raised by the cost study is the fact that the JAPA editors let APA do its 
maneuvering without weighing in against it. Scholars generally believe that scholarly values must 
be upheld at all times for scholarly work. The independence of journal editors and their journals is 
one such core value. Publication of the study was the JAPA editors' responsibility, because they had 
approved it. Although JAPA did in fact publish the study, APA, their parent organization and 
sponsor, refused to let JAPA promote the study and actively tried to undermine it in public, as we 
saw with APA's public comment above. Several of our US colleagues saw this as APA "second 
guessing" the JAPA editors. One colleague, who served on AICP's (American Institute of Certified 
Planners) Ethics Committee for several years before the JAPA study was published and in other 
official roles later, put it like this: 
 
"I feel that if there is one principle that is strong and must be honored continuously, it 
is the independence of the editorial review process from the elected members of the 
APA Board and the AICP Commission.5 So I would also suggest that it might be 
appropriate for the editor [of JAPA] to comment [on APA's actions regarding the 
study] ... on the propriety of them [APA] second guessing the editorial process." 
 
 This commentator later added the following viewpoint about the relationship between JAPA 
and APA, placing responsibility for the unsatisfactory treatment of our article not only with APA 
but also with JAPA: 
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 "The relationship between the editor of the JAPA and the APA staff is puzzling to me. 
A good editor could have been more aggressive, so I am not sure the problem resided 
mostly with the APA staff." 
 
 The lack of reaction on JAPA's part indicated that JAPA might not have the true independence 
from outside forces, including from APA, its sponsor, that an academic journal must have to be 
fully credible. This is not to say APA interfered with JAPA's decisions on publication, which are 
made by its editor based on double-blind peer review. But in this case APA interfered with the 
public exposure of a JAPA study, trying to control and "spin" it to protect APA's boosterish image 
of planning. With no comment or other reaction forthcoming from JAPA, our US colleagues 
suggested we ask APA for permission to write a comment ourselves on how we saw APA's actions. 
A few days after APA published its comment on the study I therefore asked APA for permission to 
write a rejoinder. But again APA practiced its denial response. I received no answer, including to a 
later reminder. 
 Two weeks after APA's public comment about our study and almost a month after its 
publication in JAPA, our contact at the journal reported that there continued to be a "flurry of 
requests for the article and the subsequent news stories" and that he had received a request from the 
Sierra Club for permission to reprint the article as part of a protest against a project. This would be 
the first of many similar requests from groups opposing major projects, who would use the research 
to resist specific projects. Finally, JAPA had received a letter to the editors about the article, to 
which my co-authors and I duly responded (Flyvbjerg, Holm, and Buhl, 2003). The report from 
JAPA confirmed what we already knew: Despite APA's attempts to deny and divert attention away 
from the study, we had succeeded in effectively communicating its results to the public sphere, as 
we had set out to do, for the results to inform policy and practice. This would eventually lead to 
policy changes in a number of countries on how major public works projects are planned and 
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managed (Flyvbjerg 2012: 176) and to an endorsement of our recommendations from the godfather 
of behavioral economics and Nobel Prize winner in economics 2002, Daniel Kahneman, as "the 
single most important piece of advice [that exists] regarding how to increase accuracy in 
forecasting" (Kahneman, 2011: 251). The policy changes and endorsement would most likely not 
have happened if APA had had its way with its attempt to suppress publicity of the 2002 JAPA 
study. Later, as we published more on better forecasting theory and methodology, including in 
JAPA (Flyvbjerg, Holm, and Buhl, 2005), APA too would find reason to endorse our thinking 
(American Planning Association, 2005b). APA clearly found it easier to embrace our constructive 
work than our earlier problematizations, although the latter was a precondition for the former. 
 
 
THE REAL ETHICS OF APA 
  In its efforts to deny, spin, and divert attention from the JAPA study on cost overrun, we 
consider that APA violated its own Code of Ethics on at least six counts. First, the APA/AICP Code 
of Ethics specifically states that a planner's primary obligation is to serve the public interest 
(American Planning Association 2005a).6 It would clearly serve the public interest that the public 
got to know about the billion-dollar cost overruns, misinformation, and waste of public resources 
that are typical of major public works projects and are documented by the JAPA study. By trying to 
suppress and divert publicity for the study, APA was actively working against the public interest 
and thus against the "planner's primary obligation." 
 Second, the APA/AICP Code of Ethics stipulates that a planner must strive to provide full, 
clear, and accurate information on planning issues to citizens. The JAPA study strives to do exactly 
that by publishing the largest and best dataset and set of analyses that exist on cost underestimation 
and overrun in major planning projects. With its attempt to suppress publicity and divert attention 
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from the study, APA was actively attempting to hinder such information in reaching citizens and 
was thus violating its own Code of Ethics. 
 Third, a planner must accurately represent the qualifications, views, and findings of colleagues, 
according to the Code of Ethics. With APA's public comment on the JAPA study, posted 
prominently on the APA website, APA deliberately tried to put its own spin on the findings of the 
study, as shown above, and not just in our view, but in the view of colleagues, members of APA, 
and people who held or had held office with APA. APA thus violated its own Code of Ethics on this 
point, too. 
 Fourth, the Code of Ethics states that a planner must share the results of experience and 
research, which contribute to the body of planning knowledge. With the JAPA study, we were 
trying to do just this. With their diversion strategy and tactics, described above, and their attempts at 
suppressing media coverage of the study, APA management was trying to hinder such sharing of 
results, and thus worked against the APA/AICP Code of Ethics. 
 Fifth, a planner must not commit a deliberately wrongful act, which reflects adversely on the 
planner's professional fitness, says the Code of Ethics. Here, the actions of APA regarding the JAPA 
study were, in our view, wrongful and deliberate, despite the Code saying they "must not" engage in 
this type of behavior. As such their actions reflect adversely on APA's professional fitness. 
 Finally, the APA/AICP Code of Ethics specifies that a planner must systematically and 
critically analyze ethical issues in the practice of planning. With the JAPA study we attempted to do 
this. However, with its papering over of the results and its efforts at suppressing publicity, APA 
systematically tried to suppress knowledge of our critical analysis and to limit its impacts on the 
public and on the planning profession, breaching its own Code of Ethics one more time.  
 That's a lot of "musts" disregarded by the very body that stipulates that the "musts" must be 
observed. It is a matter of serious concern that the AICP Ethics Officer, who, in collaboration with 
the AICP Ethics Committee, is responsible for upholding the Code of Ethics is not independent but 
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is also APA's Chief Executive Officer, the same person today as when the JAPA study was 
published. A former member of the AICP Ethics Committee who commented on the present study 
observed about this that the lack of an independent Ethics Officer within the structure of APA is a 
fundamental problem and that this "set the stage" for APA's dubious treatment of the JAPA study. 
In 2001, an independent counsel, who had been asked by AICP to assess its Code of Ethics, 
recommended the establishment of an independent Ethics Officer. However, APA's CEO cum 
Ethics Officer was against the proposal and successfully blocked it, according to the Committee 
member. This has left APA with its questionable practice of conflating in one and the same person 
the roles of CEO and Ethics Officer. The consequence is a lack of arm's length principle in APA's 
ethics. 
 
 
NINE QUESTIONS FOR A DEBATE ABOUT APA'S ETHICS 
 Upon reading the above analysis, an editor at JAPA commented, "I agree that APA seriously 
breached its own ethics" and that it "is a good summary of some serious APA shenanigans." A 
former APA president similarly called the study a "sad but true comment on the way APA protects 
what it perceives as its turf." Then the ex-president made a remark that surprised me: 
 
"I agree with your interpretation of events, except I think you may be a bit soft on APA 
and its code of ethics" (emphasis added). 
  
 I was surprised, because I thought that the analysis of APA's ethics above might be seen as too 
hard, despite all efforts at being as balanced and evidence-based as possible. But the former APA 
president explained that to an insider like himself there are more basic issues at stake with APA's 
ethics than what is uncovered here. To him the real problem is that after having been involved with 
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APA for several decades he cannot recall a single example of a planner being expelled from APA 
for ethical violations7 According to the former president this is not because planners are uniformly 
well-behaved, but because APA is in denial about the possibility of bad planning and malpractice 
and tends to see all planning as good.8 That is the real problem with APA, according to the former 
president, and in relation to this larger problem the analysis above seems to him just the tip of the 
proverbial iceberg and therefore soft on APA. However, given the fundamental nature of the issues 
at stake for planning as a profession and the principled debates needed to deal with them, I would 
rather err on the side of softness, because being too hard runs the risk of the critique being rejected 
as exaggerated and thus having no effect.9 
 Nevertheless, the former APA president is right that APA appears to be in denial about bad 
planning and potential malpractice and that this is a fundamental problem. To underestimate 
billions of dollars of costs in planned projects, and thereby cause billions of dollars of cost 
overruns, is bad planning by any definition of the term. And if underestimation is deliberate then it 
is lying, which is unethical by any code of conduct and unlawful in many jurisdictions for this type 
of issue (Bok 1979, Cliffe et al. 2000, Wachs 1989).10 Such bad planning and unethical behavior 
place citizens, taxpayers, investors, and other stakeholders in public projects at a risk that is 
deliberately hidden from them. APA helps hide the risk to the extent that APA suppresses publicity, 
and manipulates the spread, of knowledge about it, as we saw APA do above. This demonstrates a 
lack of concern over bad planning and malpractice which must result in a lack of accountability, 
without which a profession cannot make proper progress. To not take malpractice concerns and 
accountability seriously is to not take the profession of planning seriously. We therefore arrive at 
the paradoxical conclusion that APA is not taking the profession of planning seriously and is 
holding back its development. APA's management say they protect member interests, but they do 
quite the opposite. It is in members' interest to have malpractice problematized and reduced, and 
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this can only happen by exposing malpractice, not by denying or diverting attention from it as APA 
did in the case of the JAPA study described above. 
 Lord Acton famously said that power tends to corrupt, and absolute power corrupts absolutely. 
APA is the biggest and most powerful professional organization for planners in the world. Backed 
by this kind of authority, it is cause for worry if APA violates its own Code of Ethics and sweeps 
under the carpet concerns about bad planning and malpractice, as we saw above, so as to not upset 
the boosterish image of planning that APA is at pains to uphold. Such moral hypocrisy should give 
planners, planning academics, and planning students pause to think. We need to ponder and debate 
the real ethics of our profession in order to improve upon it. The present article was written to 
constructively contribute to this type of debate and we end by raising the following nine questions 
about APA's ethics and actions for serious discussion and dialogue, as opposed to polemics: 
 
1. How can the planning profession improve and make progress if critique and self-critique of 
planning and planners are not addressed by our biggest and most powerful professional 
organization, APA?  
 
2. How can planners become better if they are always already portrayed as good by APA – in the 
boosterish image of planning that APA paints – and if APA deliberately turns a blind eye on and 
glosses over planners doing bad planning, i.e., planning that violates basic norms of democracy, 
efficiency, and equity? 
 
3. Is APA so deeply in denial about bad planning and malpractice that APA is part of the problem 
instead of the solution? 
 
 21 
4. Is it really true, as suggested by a former APA president, that APA practically never excludes 
members due to violations of its Code of Ethics? How do the numbers and types of reported and 
sanctioned code violations for planners compare with those of other professions, including 
medicine, law, and accounting? How have the numbers developed over time? 
 
5. What should be done and by whom about APA's moral hypocrisy, documented above, where 
APA seems to disregard its own Code of Ethics, will undermine critical reviews, and will block 
transparency in order to deny and divert information about and critique of bad planning and 
malpractice? 
 
6. Is there a fundamental conflict between being an advocacy body and being the guardian of 
professional ethics? Between booster and regulator? Should the two functions be separated? 
Does APA need a fundamental rethink of its role in those terms? 
 
7. Does APA/AICP need an independent Ethics Officer, as proposed by an independent counsel in 
2001? Does the fact that APA's Ethics Officer is also APA's CEO lead to a conflict of interests 
and lack of arm's length principle? Do other professional organizations conflate these roles like 
APA does? 
 
8. What are the consequences of a boosterish professional organization like APA being linked to 
its field's major academic publication, JAPA? Is JAPA truly independent of APA? Is there a 
conflict of interest? If yes, what should be done about it? 
 
9. Critique is historically a main driver of progress. Professions, organizations, and societies that 
stifle critique tend to degenerate and become socially and politically irrelevant zombie 
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institutions. Is APA and planning in danger of such degeneration and irrelevance? Has it already 
set in? What should be done, if anything? 
 
By debating these and similar questions, perhaps we can begin to see APA and planning for what 
they are, warts and all, and then work to improve them. Instead of being stuck with the relentlessly 
positive picture-book image of planning that APA and many planners have been painting for too 
long to the detriment of progress for the profession. Planning is too important to be treated like that. 
 If planners choose to not engage in this debate, the risk is that ever more members of APA and 
AICP will follow the example of this former AICP member, who used to be seriously engaged and 
hold high office with the organization, but who wrote me after having read the analysis above: 
 
"I need to tell you that I have let my membership in AICP lapse. This may be a 
surprise or perhaps it is not. I am no longer entitled to put FAICP after my name. I 
think that the AICP is an organization founded upon principles of self promotion and 
self interest among planners [as opposed to the public interest stressed in the AICP 
Code of Ethics] ... In order to be a member, a person has to engage in 'continuing 
education,' and to amass continuing education credits by enrolling in courses, attending 
conferences, and so forth. They state that the purpose is to insure high quality and 
professional job performance by professional planners. The cost to attend the national 
AICP conference is [high], and I found the sessions to be boring and shallow. I 
interpreted the fees charged as being in the interest of the organization which is run 
like a business ... I made a personal choice to stop accumulating 'credit' by attending 
specific events that offered credit unless I happened to want to attend them. So, I was 
eventually informed that my membership in AICP would 'lapse' this year unless I 
signed up for a certain number of units of credit. I informed AICP that I preferred to 
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allow my membership to lapse ... This reflects my own assessment of their 
professional status and standing." 
 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
With a point of departure in the concept "uncomfortable knowledge," this article presents a case 
study of how the American Planning Association deals with such knowledge, in the form of 
knowledge about potential malpractice by planners and bad planning. APA is found to employ two 
well-known strategies for dealing with uncomfortable knowledge: denial and diversion. APA 
actively suppress publicity of and undermine information about malpractice concerns and bad 
planning in order to sustain a boosterish image of planning and planners. In the process, APA 
appears to have disregarded and violated its own Code of Ethics on multiple counts. In so doing, 
APA is potentially placing principles of transparency and democracy at risk, together with billions 
of dollars of citizens' money. APA justified its actions as necessary to protect APA members' 
interests, i.e., prevent planning and planners from being presented to the public in a bad light. The 
article concludes, however, that it is in members' interest to have malpractice critiqued and reduced, 
and that this best happens by exposing and addressing malpractice concerns, not by denying or 
diverting attention from them as APA did in this case. Critique is historically a main driver of 
progress. Professions, organizations, and societies that stifle critique tend to degenerate and become 
socially and politically irrelevant. The article asks whether such degeneration has set in for APA 
and planning. Finally, it is concluded that more debate about APA's ethics and actions is needed for 
improving planning practice. Nine key questions are presented for stimulating such debate. 
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NOTES 
                                                
1 The research for this paper was carried out during and immediately after the events described. Main sources quoted in 
the article have been given opportunity to comment on earlier drafts and their comments have been incorporated in this 
final version, where relevant. Publication of the research has been delayed in order to protect informants, several of 
whom acted like O'Leary's (2010: 8) "guerrilla employees." Many of these have now moved on to other positions. For 
further protection, all sources have been anonymized. The author knows the names of all sources quoted in the study. 
Documentation of all quotes and other data are on file in the author's archives. Finally, publication was also delayed in 
order to emphasize that the study is about matters of principle – malpractice and professional ethics in planning – and 
not about individuals and individual actions. 
2 A former APA president provides the following explanation of the reasons why planners misinform about costs and 
why APA does nothing about it: "I believe planners and consultants in general deliberately underestimate project costs 
because their political bosses or clients want the projects. Sometimes, to tell the truth is to risk your job or your 
contracts or the next contract. I think the professional organizations [like APA] are likely to simply point to their code 
of ethics and let it go at that [i.e., enforcing no sanctions for those who violate the code]. For example, Article B 11 in 
the AICP [American Institute of Certified Planners] code says: 'Planning process participants should not misrepresent 
facts or distort information for the purpose of achieving a desired outcome', [but I have not seen it enforced]." (Personal 
communication, author's archives). The AICP is APA's professional institute, providing certification of professional 
planners, ethical guidelines, professional development, and more. 
3 Printed on July 11 and 7, 2002, respectively. 
4 A colleague, who had previously held a high-ranking position within APA, and who commented to us on the 
unfolding of events, sent us this observation about APA's comment: "[APA] seems to want to paper-over your scholarly 
findings and downplay the importance of your article ... I think this is important." 
5 The AICP Commission is the governing body of AICP. 
6 This is the APA/AICP Code of Ethics that applied in 2002, when our study came out (American Planning Association 
1991). The Code was revised in 2005, but still contains similar rules of conduct (American Planning Association 
2005a). 
7 The author has checked this statement with other APA insiders and with APA's CEO and found that exclusions of 
members of APA/AICP for ethical violations seem very rare; like the former APA president no one appears to be able 
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to remember specific instances. According to the CEO, however, "[t]here have been individuals whose membership has 
been revoked as a result of ethics proceedings" (personal communication, author's archives). 
8 The former APA president explains: "I've been involved with APA for about 40 years having served as [several top-
level positions deleted here for reasons of anonymity] and I don't recall more than a handful of planners being brought 
up on ethical charges and no one being drummed out for ethical violations. APA believes all planning is good; note the 
slogan 'Making Great Communities Happen' and the sunny, relentlessly positive contents of its Planning Magazine." 
9 A former member of the AICP Ethics Committee similarly commented that the article "doesn't go far enough" in 
placing responsibility with specific people within APA for APA's apparent lack of adherence to its own Code of Ethics. 
For full disclosure, it should be mentioned that the study did uncover material that is substantially more critical of 
specific individuals than what is revealed here. A surprising number of respondents, who worked for APA as officials 
or employees, were remarkably critical and even resentful of the organization and how it is managed. Such resentment 
may be an interesting topic for further study, but is not the issue here. Here focus is on APA's ethics and knowledge 
management. 
10 It is worth noting that if, instead of public planners, it were employees of private corporations who deliberately 
underestimated costs like documented in the studies mentioned here, they might be committing a criminal offense under 
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002). The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (Section 802[a], 18 U.S.C. § 1519) states that whoever 
knowingly alters, destroys, mutilates, conceals, covers up, falsifies, or makes a false entry in any record, document, or 
tangible object with the intent to impede, obstruct, or influence the investigation or proper administration of any matter 
within the jurisdiction of any department or agency of the United States or any case filed under title 11, or in relation to 
or contemplation of any such matter or case, shall be fined, imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both. This is not to 
suggest that planners engage in criminal activity, but to consider that similar behavior in another context might be 
criminal. 
